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A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR HENDERSON'S
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SINGLE-TIER VERSUS
TWO-TIER PARTNERSHIPS
IN THE AM LAW 200
ROBERT A. DOLINKO*
As a practicing attorney asked to comment on a law review
article rife with statistical analysis, I hope to provide a pragmatic view
of Professor William Henderson's perceptive work-An Empirical
Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200.
Professor Henderson's Article is a thorough analysis of a
complex subject. I certainly agree with the observation that "the
superior profitability of single-tier firms appears to be primarily a
function of their reputational capital (and presumably the lawyers
and clients the firm attracts) rather than the tier structure per se."1
However, contrary to Professor Henderson's statement that the
superior profitability of large single-tier firms is "surprising," I do not
think there are many Am Law 200 partners who are the least bit
surprised that such single-tier firms are more profitable than their
two-tier competitors.
If one examines the 2005 National Law Journal 250, only about
twenty percent of those firms have single-tier partnerships.2
Examining the list of single-tier firms with principal offices in one of
the largest seven U.S. markets,3 it appears that virtually all are at the
top of any list of law firms based on reputation and prestige. Those
firms have not moved to a two-tier structure because they (thus far)
have no strong reason to do so. The rewards of achieving partnership
with those firms are so great, in terms of prestige and compensation,
that excellent attorneys from top law schools will work long hours for
many years even if the odds of achieving partnership may be
* Robert A. Dolinko is a partner in the San Francisco office of Thelen Reid & Priest LLP.
He has an undergraduate degree from Cornell University and a J.D. from New York University
School of Law.
1. William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier
Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1727 (2006).
2. See 2005 NLJ 250, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 2005, at 316, S16-S32.
3. These markets are New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, D.C., San
Francisco, Boston and Houston, according to the NLJ. Id.
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relatively slim. Moreover, those firms routinely handle sizeable
matters-transactions or litigation-that are staffed with many
associates at premium rates.4 Thus, it is not at all surprising that those
firms are more profitable than their two-tier competitors.
I respectfully disagree with Professor Henderson's suggestion
that "[t]he higher level of profitability of single-tier partnerships
cannot be explained by higher leverage,"5 as he suggests single-tier
partnerships average lower leverage than two-tier partnerships. This
might appear to be true based upon the artificial definition of
leverage used by The American Lawyer in its analysis of major law
firms.6 I would hope that most practicing lawyers in large firms would
not view second-tier partners as the precise equivalent of associates in
analyzing leverage. In my experience, partners are treated as
partners regardless of their particular tier (though I am confident
Professor Henderson is correct in his remarks about the voting rights
of second-tier partners'). Thus, if one views leverage as the ratio of
associates to all partners in a law firm, I am confident that single-tier
firms have equal or greater leverage than two-tier firms, which surely
is a factor in the former's greater Profits Per Partner ("PPP"). That
said, even if non-equity partners are viewed as associates in
determining leverage, they are certainly a more expensive form of
leverage.
Ultimately, I am of the opinion there are two primary reasons
why law firms adopt two-tier partnership structures: apparent
profitability and concern for colleagues and clients. While on some
level these may seem to be conflicting reasons, they are not really at
odds.
As noted above, Professor Henderson and The American Lawyer
equate most non-equity partners as associates in analyzing law firms'
PPP. Thus, even someone who last studied statistics as an
undergraduate decades ago understands that excluding lesser-paid
4. Billing rates, a key driver of revenue and profitability, are one economic
component that receives scant mention in Professor Henderson's Article. Yet, there is
little doubt that the high-prestige single-tier firms charge premium rates for the majority
of their work. In my experience, two-tier firms often have a broader array of practice
groups, including some that are likely to have difficulty charging premium rates due to
competitive pressures. As an employment attorney in a two-tier firm, I am very familiar
with the pressures to keep our rates competitive with smaller firms that specialize in
employment law.
5. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1696.
6. Leverage "is the ratio of all lawyers to equity partners," and equity partners "are
those who file a schedule K-1 tax form and receive no more than half their compensation
on a fixed income basis." Guide to Our Methodology, AM. LAW., July 2005, at 109, 109.
7. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1711-12 & n.87.
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partners from a calculation of PPP will result in a higher published
PPP figure. The law firm has not truly made more profits. But the
outside world is looking at a PPP figure that reflects only the firm's
higher-paid partners (in accordance with the Am Law methodology).
This benefits the two-tier firm in its ability to attract both merger
candidates and lateral partner candidates. This is no small thing in
today's legal marketplace, where many firms believe they must grow
or they will wither away.
Law firms also have adopted two-tier partnership structures in an
effort to retain solid attorneys who have knowledge, experience, and
valuable skills-but who lack either a significant book of business or
some other quality that would qualify them for the first tier of
partnership. Firms want to retain these experienced attorneys who
help form the fabric of the firm. They also want to retain these
attorneys whose continuing relationship with the firm benefits clients
who are better served by experienced partners with reasonable billing
rates as opposed to less senior associates whose lower rates cannot
offset their lower levels of knowledge, experience, and efficiency. Of
course, these partners' long-term relationships with clients help bind
those clients to the firm. Thus, the retention of partners in a second
tier benefits both the law firm and its clients.8
Whether in single-tier or two-tier partnerships, it is easy for most
large-firm attorneys to appreciate Professor Henderson's observation
that the average annual billable hours worked by partners has risen
steadily from 1,538 in 1985 to 1,703 in 2003. 9 As the practice of law
among large firms has become more of a business, the focus on
financial performance has increased-and billable hours still generate
revenues. While Professor Henderson's Article states that "[o]nce
admitted to the partnership, a lawyer in a single-tier firm has little
incentive not to shirk,"'" such a statement is unsupportable. At most
Am Law 200 firms, all attorneys-both partners and associates-
work very hard. Some partners spend significant hours in necessary
non-billable activities such as firm management, client relations, and
business development. Moreover, partners are motivated by more
than money-professional responsibility, pride, and intellectual
challenge are motivators as well. Finally, my sense of today's large
law firms is that they react fairly quickly to underperforming partners,
8. Given the relatively recent significant increases in associate compensation among
Am Law 200 law firms, it seems to me that clients and firms are getting far more value
from non-equity partners relative to less experienced associates.
9. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1710.
10. Id. at 1694.
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and there are financial (or worse) consequences for those who
underperform.
While Professor Henderson's Article is replete with keen
observations too numerous to mention, it also demonstrates how
much the profession of law has morphed into the business of law.
Fortunately, not all law firm business decisions are based solely or
primarily on economics. Firm culture and collegiality remain
important considerations for me and many other attorneys.
Despite these minor points of contention with Professor
Henderson's Article, he presents a cogent analysis of partnership
structures among large U.S. law firms. It merits the close attention of
both academics and practitioners.
